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Attacks by drones (i.e., unmanned combat air vehicles) continue to generate heated political and
ethical debates. Here we examine the quantitative nature of drone attacks, focusing on how their
intensity and frequency compare with that of other forms of human conflict. Instead of the power-law
distribution found recently for insurgent and terrorist attacks, the severity of attacks is more akin
to lognormal and exponential distributions, suggesting that the dynamics underlying drone attacks
lie beyond these other forms of human conflict. We find that the pattern in the timing of attacks is
consistent with one side having almost complete control, an important if expected result. We show
that these novel features can be reproduced and understood using a generative mathematical model
in which resource allocation to the dominant side is regulated through a feedback loop.
INTRODUCTION
Dating back to physicist L. F. Richardson’s pioneering
work nearly 100 years ago [1], the quantitative analy-
sis of human conflict has attracted research interest from
across the social, biological, economic, mathematical and
physical sciences [2–7]. As in a wide range of other human
activities [8, 9], power laws have been identified in the
severity distribution of individual attacks in insurgen-
cies and terrorism [4–6, 10], and in the temporal trend
in events [5, 10, 11]. These studies found that across a
diverse catalogue of insurgent wars in which a relatively
small opponent such as an insurgency (Red Queen [11])
fights a larger one such as a state (Blue King [11]), the
probability distribution for the severity s—the number
of fatalities—of an event (i.e., clash or attack) is given
by P (s) ∝ s−α where α ∼ 2.5, while the trend in the
timing of attacks is given by τn = τ1n
−b, where τn is the
time interval between events n and n + 1, n = 1, 2, . . .
and b is the escalation parameter. When b = 0, the Blue
King and Red Queen are evenly matched, with both effec-
tively running on the same spot—hence the terminology
surrounding the Red Queen [11]. When b 6= 0, there is an
escalation in the frequency of attacks which can be inter-
preted as a relative advantage between the Red Queen
and the Blue King [11]. The power-law finding for the
distribution of event severities is consistent with the Red
Queen (i.e., insurgent force) evolving dynamically as a
self-organizing system composed of cells (i.e., clusters)
that sporadically either fragment under the pressure of
the Blue King (e.g., state) or coalesce to create larger
cells, and taking the severity of attacks as proportional
to the sizes of the resulting cells [6].
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Here, we examine event patterns in the new form of
human conflict offered by unmanned combat air vehicles
(drones) [12]. We focus on Pakistan and Yemen because
of their association with drone strike campaigns, using
data from the New America Foundation and the South
Asia Terrorism Portal databases. The situation of drone
wars differs from the typical situation for insurgencies
and terrorism in that the attacks are now carried out by
the Blue King on the Red Queen. Moreover, the sophisti-
cation of the action-at-a-distance technology means that
any delay in the Blue King’s next attack is likely to have
come from a constraint within Blue itself (e.g., political
opposition) as opposed to any direct counter-adaptation
by the Red Queen. Our findings show that drone attacks
tend to deviate from the universal patterns observed in
the severity and timing for insurgencies and terrorism,
and instead suggest a new regime in which the Blue King
has almost complete control over the conflict. We devel-
op a generative model in which the timing of attacks is
determined solely by the resources of the Blue King, but
are regulated by a positive feedback loop due to the Blue
King’s internal sociopolitical and economic constraints.
We show that this simple model reproduces the main
features of the original data and hence the unique nature
of drone warfare.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Figs. 1A–B show the complementary cumulative distri-
bution function (CCDF) of the severity of drone attacks
using the New America Foundation database. We fit
power-law and lognormal distributions (dashed green and
solid black lines respectively; see Methods) for attacks
in Pakistan (Figs. 1A) and Yemen (Figs. 1B). We find
that the severity of the strikes is approximately described
by lognormal distributions, particularly in the case of
Pakistan. In the case of Yemen, for which we have far
less data, the lognormal is more tentative with the larg-
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FIG. 1. The severity of drone attacks approximately follows a lognormal distribution. Complementary Cumulative
Distribution Function (CCDF) of the severity of attacks (blue dots and solid line) and best fits to power-law (dashed green)
and lognormal (solid black) distributions for drone attacks in Pakistan (A) and Yemen (B). The optimal parameters for each
distribution are (A) Power-law: α = 4.82, Log-normal: µ = 1.60 and σ = 0.64, (B) Power-law: α = 2.21, Log-normal: µ = 1.65
and σ = 0.77. (C-F) CCDFs of the severity of attacks and best fits to log-normal distributions. (C and D) The attack size is
drawn from a normal distribution N(µ, σ) with µ and σ corresponding to (C) the largest value in 100 random numbers drawn
from a power-law (α = 4) and (D) a random value from a exponential distribution (λ = 5). (E and F) The attack size is
drawn from a normal distribution with µ and σ2 corresponding to (E) the largest value in 100 random numbers drawn from a
power-law (α = 4) and (F) a random value from a exponential distribution (λ = 5). The maximum likelihood parameters for
the lognormal fits are (C) µ = 1.48 and σ = 0.73, (D) µ = 1.51 and σ = 0.93, (E) µ = 1.33 and σ = 0.63, (F) µ = 1.44 and
σ = 0.86.
er events deviating most. This finding of approximate
log-normality is consistent with the notion that a drone
has a specific design and targets (predominantly houses
and vehicles) and hence a pre-determined order of magni-
tude of the range of destruction and likely severity. This
contrasts with attacks by terrorist or insurgent clusters
whose size and hence lethality crosses multiple scales,
yielding scale-free (power-law) severity distributions.
In drone attacks, an approximate lognormal distribu-
tion can arise through at least two mechanisms: First,
the fact that the severity of the attack is the result of
many independent processes (e.g., successful reporting,
good visibility, compact target group, etc.) will itself
produce a lognormal distribution in the attack size. Sec-
ond, if we take the uncertainty in the casualty number to
scale with the target size, this also produce an approx-
imate lognormal distribution for many underlying dis-
tributions of target sizes. For example, suppose attacks
target the largest known or available Red group, drawn
from a power-law distribution. Setting the mean and
standard deviation of a zero-truncated normal distribu-
tion to this value then reproduces an approximate log-
normal distribution (Figs. 1C). Similarly, we can imagine
that most attacks target small groups, where the chances
of civilian casualties are lower, and that the probability
of targeting larger groups decreases exponentially. Set-
ting the mean and standard deviation to a random value
from a exponential distribution again yields an approx-
imate lognormal distribution (Figs. 1D). The same pat-
tern is recovered if the standard deviation is set to scale
with the square root of the mean (Figs. 1E–F). We note
that further reduction in the uncertainty of group size
increases the weight of the underlying distribution. For
the case where the largest known group is targeted, this
can explain the fat tail observed for the Yemen data.
Although we have chosen to focus on fitting lognormal
distributions as the alternative to power laws, other dis-
tributions can also provide good fits. For example, the
data agrees well with an exponential distribution (see
Fig. 2A–B). Scenarios where the size of the Red groups
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FIG. 2. The severity of drone attacks approximately follows an exponential distribution. Complementary
Cumulative Distribution Function (CCDF) of the severity of attacks (blue dots and solid line) and best fits to exponential
(solid red) distributions for drone attacks in Pakistan (A) and Yemen (B). The optimal parameters for each distribution are
(A) λ = −0.21 (B) λ = −0.11. (C-F) CCDFs of the severity of attacks and best fits to exponential distributions. (C and D) The
attack size is drawn from a normal distribution with µ and σ (σ2 for D) corresponding to a random value from a exponential
distribution (λ = 5). (E and F) The attack size is drawn from a normal distribution with µ and σ (σ for F) corresponding to
the largest value in 100 random numbers drawn from a power-law (α = 4). λ is measured from the slope of the least squared
fit in semi-log scale and corresponds to (C) λ = −0.13, (D) λ = −0.17, (E) λ = −0.15,(F) λ = −0.17.
is exponentially distributed, as is the case if the proba-
bility of joining a group is constant and independent of
the number of members, would naturally yield exponen-
tial distributions (Fig. 2C–D). Approximate exponential
distributions can also be achieved if the groups are power-
law distributed (Fig. 2E–F). Our purpose has not been to
identify the best alternative to a power-law distribution,
but to show that in contrast with conventional warfare
and terrorism, the data does not follow a power-law dis-
tribution and hence feedback processes are not present
across all scales.
We now turn to the timing of attacks in order to gain
insight into the temporal dynamics of the Blue King-
versus-Red Queen activity. Following previous work [10],
we plot the time interval between consecutive attacks
τn as a function of the cardinal number of the attack
n = 1, 2, 3, . . . . The escalation parameter b is the expo-
nent of the power-law fit τn = τ1n
−b, which will be the
slope of the best-fit line on a double logarithmic plot. In
the organizational development literature in which subse-
quent events are related to production, this is referred to
as a development curve while in the psychology literature,
where subsequent events correspond to completing a cer-
tain task, it is referred to as a learning curve [11]. In this
sense, the ‘production’ or ‘completion’ of drone attacks
has a natural connection to human activity in these wider
fields. For both Pakistan and Yemen, we find that the
parameter b fails to stabilize around zero (Figs. 3A–
B), which is the expected value in a steady state where
both sides are adapting well to the opponent’s advances.
Instead, the drone attacks exhibit a large initial escala-
tion (i.e., large positive b) which then transitions to a de-
escalation (i.e., large negative b). Given the difficulty for
a Red Queen without air defenses to thwart drone attacks
directly, Figs. 3A–B suggest that one side (Blue King)
effectively holds complete control for an extended peri-
od of time, and that some internal constraints then arise
within the Blue King entity that eventually de-escalate
drone attacks. This is consistent with the decrease in
the escalation rate following the closure of a main drone
base in 2011 [13]. Even so, we note that there is some
evidence of Red adaptation to Blue attacks as described
in a recent report by “The Bureau of Investigative Jour-
nalism”, which shows a decrease in Red vehicle usage
after 2011 corresponding to a peak in attacks on vehicles
http://wherethedronesstrike.com/report/76. This
suggests that the Red Queen may be able to limit the
severity of attacks.
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FIG. 3. The timing between attacks reveals power-law relationships. (A and B) The severity of the attacks (vertical
lines, left axis) and their escalation parameter b (right axis) are plotted for a moving window of 50 attacks in (A) Pakistan
and (B) Yemen. (C) A simple model of the process. The Blue King’s resources (funding, units, experience, etc.) influence the
frequency of attacks. Resources are invested and create a positive feedback loop. The civilian population and other variables
influence the strength of this positive feedback. The amount of resources available corresponds to A, the advantage of the Blue
side. (D) Simulated attack severity plot using data generated by the model. For the severity of attacks, the size was assumed
to be drawn from the largest known group, where the group size is distributed as a power-law with α = 4.
Fig. 3C shows our simple model for explaining these
drone attack patterns. This model is of course over-
simplified given the wealth of unknowns, yet we believe
that it is a plausible first step in explaining the empirical
observations. We regard the Blue King as possessing cer-
tain resources, for example experience, units, and fund-
ing. These resources degrade over time if no investment
is made in the Blue King’s activity, i.e. if the government
does not invest in its own drone development or informa-
tion research. We assume that if there exists investment
(i.e., funding, time, etc.) then the available resources
increase due to a positive feedback loop, according to
the escalation observed A ∝ nb, where A corresponds
to the advantage of the Blue King over the Red Queen.
Similar feedback loops have been proposed in models of
conventional terrorism [14], and can be affected by exter-
nal agents, for example public opinion or budget changes.
For simplicity we take the frequency of attacks as direct-
ly proportional to the resource level, while the severity
of the attack is independent of resources.
These minimal features are able to replicate the drone
strike data (Figs. 1C–F,Figs. 1D. The results are achieved
when the resources increase as a power-law—hence this is
only sustainable for short periods of time. A constant b <
0, corresponding to the frequency of attacks decreasing
continuously, is achieved if the resources decrease contin-
uously, i.e. when there is little or no investment. Assum-
ing that each drone acts individually, that the severity of
attack varies slowly with the available resources (which
is in turn consistent with some form of adaptation by
the Red side) and that an increase in precision requires
significant amounts of development effort, we are able to
recreate approximate lognormal and exponential distri-
butions for the severity of attacks.
In summary, our analysis reveals and helps explain
patterns in the severity and timing of attacks in drone
wars, which themselves represent a new form of action-
at-a-distance human conflict. We have purposely stepped
aside from issues of ethics or technology, choosing instead
to focus on the event data since they represent a quan-
titative measure of drone war impact. We have shown
that a simple model, in which the production of drones
evolves from a shared pool of resources controlled by a
feedback loop, is able to recreate the original data and
therefore explain the overall dynamics of the Blue King’s
drone campaign. Going forward, our model could be also
used to explore how wars might unfold when drones are
used by two or more sides in conflicts.
5METHODS
We obtained all data from the New Ameri-
ca database: http://securitydata.newamerica.net/
.newamerica.net/ and crosschecked with the South
Asia Terrorism Portal database: http://www.satp.org/
satporgtp/countries/pakistan/.
We obtained the best fit to power-law distributions
following Clauset et al. [4]. We fitted lognormal distribu-
tions using the maximum likelihood estimators. For the
escalation rate analysis, τn = τ1n
−b, we plotted the num-
ber of attack vs. the time between attacks on a log-log
scale. We used a rolling window of 50 attacks and accept-
ed every value of b that allowed for a correlation greater
than 20%, which allows us to measure fast transitions.
We simulated 200 attacks with our model. The initial
advantage was set to 1. The time to the next attack
is equal to 323 · A−1, where the 323 mimics t0 for the
Pakistan conflict. At every step (attack) the advantage of
the Blue King changed by the factor ((n+ 1)/n)
b
, where
n is the attack number. For the first 50 attacks b = 0.5;
for the last 50 attacks b = −0.5.
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